Oct 6, 1993
RABIN: LET’S TALK ABOUT SUCCESS, NOT FAILURE
By David Makovsky

PRIME Minister Yitzhak Rabin — who goes to Cairo today for follow-up talks with Yasser Arafat on Israel’s agreements with the PLO — says secret talks are needed with Syria to advance the peace process.

Mr. Prime Minister, you have initiated a meeting with PLO leader Yasser Arafat in Cairo tomorrow. What do you hope will be accomplished and is it the start of regular working meetings between the two of you so self-rule can succeed?

We have made a strategic decision that the PLO is the partner for the implementation of the agreement. What brought me to have this meeting is, first and foremost, {the desire} to discuss in practical terms the format of the negotiations of the agreement. Almost a month has passed, and in addition to mobilizing funds or commitments to funds, the interpretation of the declaration of principles needs thorough negotiations. We need to set up the framework of negotiations, which committees, etc.

Will the meetings be regularized?

I dont know.

Do you object to Mr. Arafat’s arriving in Jericho at the start of the year?

I dont want to deal in details. I want to deal with the framework.

He is likely to ask for gestures tied to the release of Palestinian prisoners. Will you agree?

I won’t answer hypothetical questions. If he asks, he will get an answer.

In an August interview on Israel Television, you said: ’When the Palestinians see we are making progress with Syria and Lebanon … there will be progress with them.’ You switched from a Syria-first approach to finalizing the secret Oslo agreement in less than two weeks! Did you believe in the Syrian track, or was this just a tactic to move the Palestinians along?

First, I approved the secret contacts with the Palestinians at the beginning of this year, in February … When I decided to go all the way with {them}. I found that {the Syrians} still demanded total withdrawal {from the Golan}, uprooting of the Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights, and {were not even ready for} full-fledged peace.

This was after Secretary of State Warren Christopher returned from Damascus in August?

Yes. At the same time, with the Palestinians, there were signs of serious change. On four or five major issues, they agreed to what I had doubted they would agree to. First, united Jerusalem will be under Israeli control and outside the jurisdiction of the Palestinians for the whole interim period.

Second, settlements … Thirdly, overall Israeli responsibility for the security of Israelis and external security. Fourthly, keeping all options open for the negotiations on a permanent solution.

Then came the idea that, once we negotiated with the PLO, we had to decide {who} is the partner, and their readiness to send exact formulations. But basically the letter Arafat sent me on the changes in the PLO brought me to the conclusion that here we have something that … will be the first agreement between the Palestinians and Israel.

We had peace with an Arab country, but that did not change the attitude of the world, because rightly or wrongly for 50 years, if not more, everybody used to say that the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Jewish-Palestinian problem.

The risks taken from the point of view of security, {and} even for the personal security of Israelis … are much less than vis-a-vis Syria.

Mr. Rabin, if what Christopher brought you was not so great on Syria, it sounds that you spoke of Syria-first just to move the Palestinians along?

It was based on facts. I didn’t disclose where we were with the Palestinians because it was a secret meeting. {As for} the Syrians, what I did say was also right. I would not deny that, in all bargaining, there are tactics.

You have seem to have had a dual-approach until now: flexibility in negotiations, with an iron fist on security. But with a PLO agreement, your room to maneuver will be dramatically reduced. Any military moves will be seen as coming at Yasser Arafat’s expense. Can you see Israel pursuing wanted fugitives if the Palestinian police do not cooperate?

At present, I will not answer hypothetical questions, {because} I assume that they have to take their own responsibility to maintain public order in their areas of control. I assume it would be in their interest also to prevent friction, because friction can create problems. Problems can create crisis. Crisis might lead to something that militarily is very simple {but} not so much politically …

PROBLEMS OF SECURITY

You have repeatedly made the distinction between security that guards against threats to Israel’s existence and personal safety. You speak of Gaza-Jericho as a litmus test, but the accord does not speak of this as being conditional. What is your criterion for failure?

The first stage is Gaza/Jericho, and the real test will be in Gaza. Jericho is a minor issue. We will see to what extent they can prevent terrorism against us. Meeting the expectations of the Palestinians for economic progress — that will not be immediate, but at least it creates a more solid basis for their expectations.

Basically I will judge it by two criteria: First, security for Israelis in Israel, in the territories and in the Gaza Strip. Secondly, how they move in taking over the running of the life of the Palestinians.

What is the cost of retaking the territories if this fails?

I don’t want to talk about it at this stage because the problem is not what will happen if … The problem is how to make sure that the agreement will be implemented. I want the success of the agreement, not to start to talking {about} what will happen if something goes wrong. The problem is how to succeed, not how to fail.

There has just been a suicide car bombing near Beit-El. Are you concerned that we are entering a new phase of violence that until now has only been attempted by Shi’ites in Lebanon?

We have had at least three examples before {in the territories} … In the past, it came mainly from Hizbullah because they’re religious fanatics, and this is the case with Hamas. I would not exclude the danger of additional suicidal attempts by Hamas or Islamic Shi’ites.

REFUGEES

The Israel-PLO accord speaks about the return of persons displaced since the ’67 war, with modalities to be decided by a four-member committee as per Camp David. The Palestinians say that if you include offspring, this totals 800,000 people.

Nonsense. The figure is nonsense. {Their return to the territories} has to be agreed on. If they expect tens of thousands, they live in a dream, an illusion.

So we are talking about family reunification, or something relatively small?

Increased family reunification.

US INVOLVEMENT

What about US involvement? After the signing at Camp David until the Israel-Egyptian treaty, there was a six-month period when even the president of the US had to fly here to get involved. Are the Americans going to have to become involved?

I can’t believe this is going to be the way in the future. We’ll negotiate, but we’ll see problems. Whoever is not preparing himself to see differences of opinion — sometimes even verbal confrontations — doesn’t know the meaning and the complexity of what we are trying to achieve together, the PLO and us.

FINAL STATUS TALKS

While relatively few settlers are directly affected by the Gaza-Jericho phase, this is not the case in the second phase. According to the agreement, the IDF is to redeploy all over the territories. This means there could be more friction between Israelis and Palestinians. As we saw with Hamas deportations and the closure of the territories, events on the ground can overwhelm the best-laid plans. So maybe the greater part of wisdom is to skip the second phase in nine months because maybe Arafat does not want elections, and go straight to a territorial solution where you separate Israeli and Palestinian populations permanently?

I don’t believe that; if we shift from the interim agreement directly to the question of permanent solution, the issue brought up first will be Jerusalem; that will practically stop everything. Let’s start first to change a reality, to give them something that they might work on. To see how well it works. How do you keep people apart? Settlements, especially in the densely populated area that I used to call political settlements, were not established from any security point of view; their whole purpose was political, to make any solution almost impossible. This was the idea of the Likud.

Let’s put it this way: Do you rule out the possibility of final-status talks beginning before they are mandated in two years?

For two and a half years almost. The clock starts to tick at the end of our withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho … I more than doubt that it will be possible {to start final status talks early}. You can’t deal with interim agreement and permanent agreement at the same time.

Is there any oral understanding on the final status?

No, to the best of my knowledge. They stick to their goals. There is nothing about a Palestinian state, or a capital in part of Jerusalem. I stick to my position: no Palestinian state, Jerusalem must remain united under Israeli sovereignty, and be our capital forever.

I believe that many ideas can come up. For example, a tripartite agreement between two sovereign states and a Palestinian entity which is less than independent.

If cooperation between Israel and the PLO succeeds, why would you be against a Palestinian state? Henry Kissinger just wrote that as a result of the Israel-PLO accord, a Palestinian state is inevitable.

With all due respect to Kissinger’s position, I look at it differently. I believe that in any autonomy there is a danger of an independent state; whoever ignores it doesn’t see the facts of life. Therefore, I am not coming to say there is no danger of it. Knowing that there is a danger, knowing that I oppose it, I believe we can do many things to prevent it from being inevitable … I don’t believe there is room for an additional state between Israel and Jordan.

JORDAN

I am not expecting you to divulge details of your alleged meeting with King Hussein in the Gulf of Akaba last week. However, in the aftermath of the agreement with the PLO, how committed are you to the future existence of the Hashemite Kingdom? Have you damaged historic ties with the kingdom by failing to inform him in advance of the Oslo accord?

As an Israeli, I am interested in the existence of an independent Jordan under the Hashemite Kingdom. I believe it is an important buffer state between us and Iraq, between Syria and Saudi Arabia. I believe it is vital for Israel that Jordan retain its capability to be an advanced, prosperous country — an independent state under the Hashemite regime.

Is Hashemite rule important because ultimate Palestinian control there would be an unstable force?

I believe at this stage that the danger to the regime is from the extreme Islamic elements, more than from the PLO.

Is the trust between Israel and King Hussein broken?

I think their problem is an economic problem, a major economic problem. There are still Palestinian refugees in camps there. Kuwait expelled over 300,000, and the major burden, economically and therefore also politically, is on the shoulders of the king. Now, I will assume that he sees a meeting of donors {held last Friday in Washington}. Everything is for the Palestinians in the territories. He might ask himself and the world: "What about me? I have also 1.5m.—1.8m. Palestinians; what to do with them?"

I believe that the answer which Israel and the world will have to give him is: ’There is no free lunch. You want to make a major decision to have peace with Israel? Then you deserve aid.’

I didn’t say not to help him {now}, but not in a major way. Major {assistance} is related to political decisions, courageous political decisions on his part.

SYRIA

With all the action involving Palestinians, are your hands too full to deal with Syria?

No, I believe that we have to continue negotiating with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, but the focus will be on implementation {with the Palestinians}. What will be the purpose of reaching agreement, if we cannot prove that the agreement already signed is being implemented?

There is now a clear pattern. Before breakthroughs, there are secret talks. In Oslo, there were secret talks with Palestinians. Before Egypt’s Anwar Sadat came to Jerusalem, there was what is known as the Dayan-Tohamy talks in Morocco. Do you think something parallel will occur with Syria?

I believe you are right. I can’t recall an agreement that has been reached since 1949 without an intimate, secret exchange of views.

But such secret talks have not happened yet, despite the rumors?

I say it has not happened, unfortunately.

Do you think that you and {Syrian President Hafez} Assad understand each other’s red lines?

I hope so.

How do you explain that Assad has not taken steps that would publicly reassure the Israeli public on peace and security? Do you explain it as bargaining tactics, such as trying to get something from the US, or not being interested in peace, or doers he simply not understand the workings of a democracy? Perhaps he thinks you are the Israeli equivalent of himself, a ruler who can wake up one morning and make a snap decision that he can have the whole Golan?

It is one of the questions that I cannot answer. Why can’t he afford to speak to Israeli journalists, to speak to his own people in clear terms? He could even put Israel in a real bind if he suddenly declared he is ready for peace — full-fledged open borders or diplomatic relations/embassies, the policy of normalization, agreement for security arrangements? He could then say: "The ball is in your court."

You are saying that Assad could put Israel on the spot on a Golan withdrawal, but has chosen not to?

I saw a headline somewhere quoting Assad as saying: "My people are not yet ripe for full-fledged peace." If he thinks so or wants it to be so, it is his problem. He supports rejectionist Palestinian organizations, who oppose the peace negotiations, let alone the agreement. He doesn’t allow the Lebanese Army to redeploy farther south in Lebanon.

At the same time, he doesn’t come forward. I don’t expect him to do what President Sadat of Egypt did when he came to Jerusalem, but to at least be more forthcoming, to show his readiness for peace.

Cabinet ministers quote you as saying that "the extent of withdrawal is like the extent of peace." The implication sounds clear: full withdrawal from the Golan in return for full peace. Did you say this?

I did say it. But I said what I said with reservations: withdrawal on the Golan Heights to secure and recognized boundaries. The geographic depth will be dependent on what we will get in return in terms of peace.

ARAB COUNTRIES

In response to the Israel-PLO accord, the Arab countries have not indicated that they will drop the economic boycott, even though this was linked two years ago to Israel’s slashing settlement activity in the territories. Morocco has not established diplomatic relations and we do not know about Tunisia. How do you explain this?

To a certain extent, I am disappointed. Before we reached agreement with the Palestinians, all the Arabs claimed that this was the core, the crux of the conflict. But there has not been the kind of positive response on normalization of relations with Israel that one might have expected, and there are still objections to the removal of the third-party boycott.

The fact that it has again not happened {suggests} a question mark about what most of the Arab countries have claimed.

Hag sameah, Mr. Prime Minister.

Hag sameah!

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