It has been one year since the war in Lebanon began. This is therefore the time to sum up the results of this war, although its end is still nowhere in sight.
The outcome of the war in Lebanon should be examined in view of the declared as well as the undeclared objectives of the government. As we recall, there were goals the IDF had received in advance, and there were other goals that were formed during the fighting. Both can be divided into three categories.
— The first category: far-reaching political objectives, such as making peace between Lebanon and Israel, and a formal agreement concerning the normalization [of relations] between the two states while a new political order is being established in Lebanon. — The second category: far-reaching military objectives, such as the elimination of the PLO’s terrorist organizations and their headquarters in Lebanon, and inflicting a blow to the Syrians in order to prevent them from completing their deployment in preparation for an initiated assault operation against Israel. — The third category: limited political objectives, such as securing peace for the Galilee by keeping its settlements at a safe distance from the artillery range.
Today, with the end of the first year to the war, it is possible to say with confidence that no far-reaching political objective has been or will be achieved as a result of this war. The Lebanese-Israeli agreement constitutes, in fact, an admission by the government of Israel of its failed efforts to attain far-reaching political objectives. None of the far-reaching military objectives have been or will ever be achieved as a result of this war. The terrorist and assault operations against the IDF in Lebanon are clear evidence of the failure to eliminate the PLO, even in the region of southern Lebanon. The high alert in facing the Syrian army, and the security tension that has risen lately, are evidence of the failure to harm the Syrian army’s capacity to initiate assault operations, limited as they might be, in Lebanon. The third objective, security
for the Galilee settlements, has also not been attained. Today it is doubtful whether it can be attained after IDF soldiers exit Lebanon.
To sum it up, of all of Israel’s wars, there has never been another war whose political and security achievements were so poor as this war in Lebanon. Worst of all is the fact that the future holds no great prospects. The very opposite is true. Great dangers can be expected.
What exactly happened that made the war in Lebanon such a failure and so painful, more than any other war of the State of Israel?
This was caused, first and foremost, by the mistaken way of thinking by the decision-makers within the government of Israel. They were mistaken when they set their objectives, and therefore also in the way they conducted the war. As is known, until the Lebanon war, no Israeli government set out on an initiated war without the realization of favorable conditions, and without most of the Israeli public feeling that there was no escape from launching a war. The sense of having no choice is the moral backbone that provides the IDF and the people the strength to withstand every war, particularly a self-initiated war. This government’s way of thinking, of a war of choice, is basically wrong and mistaken. Even more so as the political and military way of thinking, which determines the objectives of the war, was unfounded and proven to be a failure.
The assumption that lay the groundwork for the government’s political and military way of thinking — that it would be possible to attain peace between an Arab country and Israel through an initiated war — was and remains a dream. Peace, in the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict, can be achieved only through negotiations at the negotiating table, and this of course when Israel’s military might is one of the components that persuades the leaders of the Arab states to forgo the way of war and set out on the road to peace.
The military assumption — that Arab terrorism can be eliminated with one military strike — was also proven to be a mistake. I am skeptical of whether Arab terrorism can be eliminated at all. It also exists within the Arab countries, even without any connection to the Israeli-Arab conflict. It can definitely not be eliminated where Israel is concerned, except through an agreement with an Arab state whose government has control over its territory. Lebanon, as is well known, is not one of those.
These positions were expressed by the Labor Party before and during the war. I supported a limited operation to push back terrorist activities and the artillery so that they cannot harm our northern settlements. How did I view this operation? I saw it as an extended Litani Operation, stretching all the way to the Zaharani River. Not a change in the political situation in Lebanon, not the removal of the Syrian army from Lebanon, not the elimination of all terrorist headquarters in Lebanon. I assumed that the IDF would advance 40 to 45 kilometers, and then a political solution would be found in the shape of a national or multi-national force that would remain in the northern part, with Hadad’s forces expanding the areas under their control. I assumed that this wouldn’t be the perfect solution to the problem of terrorism, but that
conditions would be created that would allow a normal life in the north. Even today I would not have made the promise that no Katyusha would ever again fall on the settlements in the north.
With the end of the first year to the war, the State of Israel is facing a difficult problem. The Israeli-Lebanese agreement is now a conditional one, and is not being upheld at this stage. Syria refuses to withdraw its forces from Lebanon in order to enable the implementation of the agreement. Syria’s military strengthening, with the backing of the USSR, gives it a better bargaining and negotiating position regarding a solution in Lebanon. As things appear today, there is no reason for Syria to consent to any cooperation that would allow the implementation of the agreement. Today Israel is facing two options: the first — to continue and hold on to Lebanon without knowing for what and for how long. The second — to start a unilateral withdrawal, with the knowledge that it is very doubtful whether there is a way to defend
the northern settlements.
This is a very sad situation at the end of a long and painful war.
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