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Tough report expected from Or Commission The Or Commission of Inquiry wound up its public hearings yesterday and will now meet privately to prepare its final report on who was responsible for the outbreak of riots in the Israeli Arab sector in October 2000 and the fact that 13 Arabs were killed by police during the disturbances. The riots broke out on October 1 and lasted until October 8. During those days, Muhammad Jabarin and Ahmad Jabarin were killed in Umm el-Fahm on October 1 (Ahmad Jabarin was shot on October 1 and died the following day); Rami Ghara was killed in Jatt on October 1; Misleh Abu Jarad (a Palestinian from Deir el-Balah) was killed in Umm el-Fahm on October 2; Alaa Nasser and Asil 'Asla were killed in Arabbe on October 2; Walid Abu Saleh and Imad Ghanaim were killed in Sakhnin on October 2; Iyad Lubana was killed in Nazareth on October 2; Ramez Bushnak was killed in Kafr Manda on October 3; Muhammad Khamayesh was killed in Kafr Kanna on October 3; and Wissam Yazbek and Omar A'kkawi were killed in Nazareth on October 8. The commission began its public hearings on February 19, 2001. In the first stage, it held 66 sessions and heard testimony from 349 witnesses. A year later, on February 27, 2002, it sent letters to 14 of the witnesses and warned them that they were likely to be hurt by the commission if it was convinced the allegations against them that had emerged during the first round of testimony were true. In the second round of testimony, it heard 89 witnesses during 25 sessions. According to the choice of witnesses who received warning letters, the Or Commission made it clear it intended to tackle the events of October 2000 in as comprehensive a manner as possible. The 14 included two senior politicians, four leaders of the Israeli Arab community, including three MKs, six senior police officers, including several field commanders, and three policemen suspected of killing or wounding demonstrators. Many previous commissions of inquiry have been criticized for going after the 'little guys,' but the Or Commission is putting the emphasis on top policy-makers in the government and the police, senior commanders in the field, and top Israeli Arab representatives. The commission was only able to link two of the 14 witnesses directly to the killings. Even if they are put on trial and found guilty, they would account for only three of the 13 victims. If the conduct of the commission members, especially Or, in the second round of the hearings is anything to judge by, their conclusions will be tough and frankly worded. Or grilled the witnesses relentlessly and did not defer to any of them. The testimony revealed some unexpected facts. For example, neither former prime minister Ehud Barak, former internal security minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, or former police inspector-general Yehuda Wilk knew that the police had used snipers in Umm el-Fahm for days or even weeks afterwards. The testimony also showed that the instructions to police on how to handle the disturbances, especially the blocking of Highway 65 at Umm el-Fahm, were confused and obfuscated. Barak maintained that he stressed above all the need to calm down the situation. Police officers in the field were told Barak had said to do everything possible to keep the road open. The public should not have overly high expectations of the practical significance of the commission's findings, according to informed sources. Everyone seems to agree that whatever the immediate causes of the October 2000 riots, the underlying causes go so deep that it will take years to heal them. The Or Commission was not appointed to deal with the root causes of the violence. If anything, the commission may have a practical and immediate impact by calling for changes in police deployment in the Israeli Arab sector. The commission members, especially Or, have clearly indicated that they believe the way police used plastic coated steel bullets during the riots was lethal, and that it is a bad weapon for dispersing riots. By the same token, it could condemn and outlaw the use of snipers in the ways they were employed twice in October 2000.
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