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ARIEH O’SULLIVAN:
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How big a threat?

On paper, the Syrian military machine looks formidable: 380,000 men, 12 divisions, 3,700 tanks, 2,600 artillery pieces and nearly 500 aircraft. But on closer inspection, the Syrian army does not pose a significant tactical threat to Israel and has no viable tactical war option.

It was most likely an extreme embarrassment for the Syrian central command to witness how Israeli warplanes were able to strike with impunity a target so close to the Syrian capital. Not only that, they have had to suffer the public indignity since Sunday’s IAF strike of the media repeatedly mentioning their "obsolete‘ forces as being ’no match" for Israel.

To put it bluntly, the Syrian army has not just stood still for the past two decades, but has gone backwards. The only serious procurement that the cash-strapped Syrian army has made recently has been for Kornet anti-tank rockets, which military sources say were funded by Saudi Arabia.

Most of its resources have been used to bolster its arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles of Scud classes and build fortified bunkers as protection from IAF strikes. They have also acquired hundreds of warheads armed with Sarin and VX nerve agent, and possibly biological warheads, as well.

Its tanks are said to be blind at night and it is estimated that 80 percent of its military equipment needs upgrading. The Syrian navy is in poor shape and its three submarines are literally rusting away. The once formidable Soviet-era air defenses have remained static and are said to be in dire need of across-the-board upgrades.

"The threat of all-out war does not exist,‘ says a senior intelligence officer. ’At least not one that they start."

Still, the Syrian army, with five divisions permanently stationed on a well-fortified Golan Heights, do present a formidable foe in any IDF offensive. In a war, the IAF would likely achieve air supremacy over Syria within hours and IDF doctrine estimates that Syria would ultimately lose up to 80 percent of its inventory of military equipment.

While the Syrian army today is virtually the same force that clashed with the IDF in 1982, the Israeli army has developed mightily during the past generation, spending billions on expanding its firepower and command and control. The gap has never been so large.

And yet, no matter how strong Israel’s divisions are against Syria, that country is capable, more than any other, of inflicting very heavy casualties on the Israeli rear. Some estimate casualties from a Syrian Scud attack could top 10,000.

The key in any confrontation with Syria, intelligence sources say, would be to subjugate its army without totally defeating it, in order not to draw the wrath of the Syrian missiles.