« home

ZALMAN SHOVAL:
---------------------------------------------------------
Special relationship

Political alliances, unlike (some) marriages, are not made in heaven, they are usually founded on rock-solid national interests. Personal friendships between leaders do help, of course, but only up to a point. The American-Israeli special relationship — and in this case the term special is no mere adjective — is not fundamentally different, though it has undoubtedly also been affected by such factors as memories of the Holocaust, domestic US politics (which is not specific to American-Israeli relations), and the shared democratic values and Judeo-Christian heritage in a generally unfriendly world.

The relationship has been growing steadily — in spite of often fierce, though temporary, disagreements between Israel and almost every American administration since 1948 — whether it was the arms embargo during the Truman administration, Eisenhower’s opposition to the Sinai campaign, the sale of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, or the ongoing rows over Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria.

None of the above, however, affected the steady upward path of the relationship — especially since the 1967 Six Day War which, on the one hand, underscored the existential threat Israel still found itself in, while, on the other, its sensational victory turned the Jewish state in the eyes of many Americans from a strategic liability into a strategic asset (leading to the important military relationship between the two countries).

Not so long ago, especially after the end of the Cold War, there was a debate whether the relationship was essentially based on strategic interests or on shared values. But making a Manichean distinction between "values‘ and ’strategic interests" was always misleading; as America’s present troubled relationship with Saudi Arabia shows that without at least a certain degree of shared values, even the most interest-based strategic relationship is bound to crumble sooner or later.

Another important element is the US Congress. Though some Israeli leaders in the past, not understanding the rules of America’s politics or constitution, erroneously believed that Israel could advance its aims by relying on the White House alone or on Congress alone — the latter’s solid support for Israel is indeed a factor which every administration, including the present one, will have to reckon with, not least in a situation where so many of its important policy-aims may depend on the support of that body. When some over-enthusiastic Israeli politicians declared that the American-Israeli relationship "had never been better,‘ truth to some extent was on their side. (One remembers the ’Likud‘ functionaries, apparently regarding this as a compliment, who proclaimed that President George W. Bush’s June 24, 2002 speech, which later spawned the ’road map‘, had made him eligible for membership in the ’Likud" Central Committee…)

But even without going overboard, for a number of reasons, the present Bush administration can indeed be regarded as being especially close to Israel — a fact which at first took more than a few observers by surprise, though not this writer. Still, even this warm and close relationship is not immune to occasional discords, such as the present, perhaps avoidable one about Israel’s proposed security fence, and in the future, almost inevitably, about certain aspects of the road map.

By comparison, the Clinton administration, though certainly not wanting in empathy, will probably go down in US-Israel history as less positive, not least because of its lack of evenhandedness during the Netanyahu government. The main blame for Israel’s deteriorating situation during the Clinton-Gore administration, however, must be placed on Israel’s self-made Oslo debacle.

The road map, which in its present form is probably more of a European-UN document than an American one, does bear the US imprimatur, having been fathered by Bush’s June 2002 speech. Both the "map‘ and the speech call for the establishment of a ’democratic, viable Palestinian state" living in peace alongside Israel.

Though the Israeli government has in principle expressed its support, the concept of Palestinian statehood has more than a few ingredients for wide-ranging differences. Moreover, many Israelis will ask themselves a more basic question, i. e. why will the proposed Palestinian state be all that different from most other Arab and Muslim states — and what guarantee is there that "Palestine" won’t be just another terror-supporting, possibly irredentist rogue-state?

Furthermore, the above-mentioned discord about the proposed security fence brings into sharp focus not only the matter of the settlements, but the very question of the future borders between Israel and the proposed Palestinian entity.

Ideological and religious considerations aside, Israel is not going to rely on the "peace-loving‘ nature of the Palestinian state for its security — even if bolstered by international guarantees. Israel, therefore, cannot afford to relinquish the concept of ’defensible borders‘ and of the Camp David-based ’security locations.‘ In the past, though less so at present, American officials have expressed support, at least in part, for Israel’s position in this respect — e. g. president Ronald Reagan’s declaration that Israel ’should never be asked to return to where it was eight miles wide,‘ or the statement that UN Security Council resolution 242 was ’incompatible‘ with the pre-1967 ’green line.‘ Israel will thus want to feel confident that the present US administration won’t allow others, including its ’Quartet" partners, to lead it astray in the matter of its legitimate security concerns.

HAVING READ this far, the reader might mistakenly be led to give too much weight to possible pitfalls in Israel’s relationship with the Bush administration — rather than to the much more significant and concrete high-points. Actually, the reasons for the close relationship go much deeper even than the common threat from Arab-Islamist terrorism — though this is an important element, especially since 9/11 — both peoples understanding that whatever their political, ideological or religious motivations, terrorists cannot be assuaged, they must be destroyed.

As a result, and though not always agreeing with Israel’s modus operandi, the US has basically been supportive of its anti-terror campaign. The consistent political support the Bush administration lends to Israel at the UN and other international bodies which seem to have made Israel-baiting their main pastime is significant, as are the $9 billion loan guarantees which are a vital prop to Israel’s ailing economy.

But the relationship also benefits from a common Weltanschaung with regards to how things are, or should be, in the world we live in, be it in the realm of strategic thinking, of economics, or of democratization, among others. Hence, the fight against terror is not only a military matter, but even more so, a joint ideological stance against those who want to destroy both America’s and Israel’s way of life. In the Bush administration’s eyes, the world is divided between those who perpetrate and support terror and those who oppose it, and in this respect Israel is clearly on the side of the angels.

But even that’s not the whole story: Wary of its traditional Arab allies, the US under Bush sees in a strong Israel an important component of its overall strategic thinking about the future of the wider Middle East, all the way to India. In other words, though moving towards a solution of the Palestinian problem is an important American aim in itself, it also fits in with her larger strategic designs — a view which Israel’s present leadership fully shares and supports.

Obviously, this article doesn’t presume to give the whole picture — not only as, contrary to the French saying that "nothing is as permanent as the temporary," in politics it’s often the other way round, nothing being as temporary as the supposedly permanent. I have scarcely alluded to what Israel may be required to do so that relations with the Bush administration will remain as strong and beneficial as they are at present, indeed, perhaps the best ever.

Surely, we must try to avoid confrontations in matters which are not really vital to our interests, but it will also necessitate a great deal of active — some would say proactive — diplomacy on our part.

The writer, a former ambassador to Washington and Likud legislator, is chairman of the Bank of Jerusalem mortgage bank.