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EDITORIAL: The watershed war Israel as a nation has had its share of traumatic moments, but none more traumatic than the war that began 25 years ago on Yom Kippur. The Yom Kippur War was a watershed event in a national psyche still soaring upon the sense of invincibility generated by the breathtaking Six Day War victory — one which suddenly brought it down to earth. For Israel, the Yom Kippur War created an historical paradox: a military victory that precipitated a deep crisis in confidence. Militarily, the Yom Kippur War was arguably Israel’s greatest victory. Starting from a position in which the enemy had achieved a near-total degree of strategic surprise, the reserve forces mobilized rapidly, if chaotically, to repel the numerically superior Egyptian and Syrian armies. The IDF advance continued until the army was close to Cairo and Damascus, and was being restrained from going further by diplomatic more than by military considerations. Once the war was over, however, Israel plunged into an understandable sea of self-criticism and self-doubt. The Agranat Commission found a long list of glaring mistakes that cost untold numbers of lives — from the mistaken intelligence assessments before the war, to lack of planning to ensure a smooth, full-scale mobilization, to the misplaced confidence in the ability of regular forces to hold fixed lines (such as the Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal), to the assumption that the air force would operate almost unchallenged. As damning as the Agranat Commission’s report was, however, it only began to capture the sense of disillusionment that enveloped Israeli society. The Yom Kippur War discredited the entire establishment that had ruled in an unbroken chain since the state’s founding, and led to the revolutionary victory of Menachem Begin’s Likud in the 1977 elections. Further, it spurred the rise of two opposing, arguably messianic, movements: Gush Emunim and Peace Now. Like America after Vietnam and Watergate, Israel after the Yom Kippur War lost confidence in itself and its leaders. The vacuum created by the collapse of faith in the country’s direction could no longer be filled by the single dominant ideology that drove the building of the state. In its place came, on the right, the settlement movement, and on the left, a belief that Israeli blindness, not Arab enmity, was the primary obstacle to peace. A generation later, both movements have succeeded to a large degree. Though the settlers will not succeed in having Israel retain all of Judea and Samaria under its control, there is little doubt Israel will keep more territory than it would have had the Arab world accepted Israel’s offer to negotiate peace treaties following the Six Day War. Peace Now, for its part, has succeeded even more spectacularly. Just over five years ago, talk of talking to the PLO, or of a Palestinian state, was political suicide. Today a Likud prime minister considers it a victory when Yasser Arafat meets with him for the purpose of negotiations, whose assumed conclusion is some form of a Palestinian state. Twenty-five years later, the national consensus has evolved much closer to the goals of Peace Now than those of Gush Emunim. Those who believe the Arab world is ready to make lasting peace with Israel, combined with those who are not sure but see no alternative but to try, constitute a solid majority. If the Yom Kippur War signaled the end of Israel’s pioneering, perhaps over-confident phase, the period since has been marked by increasing restlessness to complete unfinished business. The legacy of vulnerability left by the Yom Kippur War, and reinforced by the passive absorption of missile attacks during the Gulf War, both impels the need for resolution, while making it more difficult. Post-1973 Israel has trouble appreciating its own strength, and frets about being surprised again. In an age of growing threats from non-conventional weapons, delivered by missiles or by terrorists, concern over being surprised is not unfounded. The IDF has not yet undergone sufficient restructuring to fully reflect the new balance of threats and the changing nature of modern warfare. On the other hand, Israel’s population growth, the collapse of the Soviet Union, peace agreements, and a bent for integrating sophisticated technologies, have all contributed to enhancing Israel’s strategic position beyond where it was 25, or even 10, years ago. Perhaps, with the Yom Kippur War marking the half-way point between Israel’s founding and its jubilee, we can now find a balance between arrogance and fear, and between exaggerated senses of invincibility and vulnerability. Peace of mind and peace with our neighbors can contribute to each other.
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