Labor's Love's Lost
Daniel Bloch

Levi Eshkol, Israel's third prime minister, died on the morning of Wednesday, February 26, 1969. In historical perspective we now know that this date also marked the beginning of the decline of the Labor Movement - which just a few months previously had reached the peak of its achievement by uniting all its factions - notably Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avoda - to form the Israel Labor Party.

From the first prime minister David Ben-Gurion to Levi Eshkol, the Labor Movement went from strength to strength, and was the focal point of Israel's political map. No government could be formed without it. It was responsible for all that was good or bad in this country and in this society. Overall, its balance sheet showed more positive than negative.

In 1969, old-style politics still prevailed. There were no primaries, no campaign headquarters full of media and political consultants. A small nominating committee decided who would succeed Eshkol. No more than an hour after his death, a group of veteran Mapai leaders standing near the entrance to the MKs' cafeteria in Jerusalem were asked by a young reporter what would happen next - who would be the next prime minister?

Golda Meir, of course, one answered. And the rest agreed.

The journalists were shocked. Until that moment, conventional wisdom had held that after Eshkol, there would be a fierce battle for succession between the top two leaders from the next generation - Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan - with the party machine of Mapai, the biggest Labor faction, opposing Dayan.

But the party machine had a different scenario in mind: If Dayan wasn't elected, it preferred Golda as an "interim leader" to avoid a party split. This, it was said at the time, would give the apparatus time to build a strong majority to support Allon and stop Dayan from running.

Behind this move stood then-finance minister Pinhas Sapir, the movement's king-maker. Both he and the party machine were sure that a bitter fight, and a possible rift in the Labor Party, had been avoided. In the short term, they might have been right. But taken in historical perspective, we can surely say that the decision to nominate Golda marked the beginning of Labor's decline.

At the time of Eshkol's death, the Labor Alignment's faction had 67 MKs, including its Arab satellite factions. Never before or since has Labor had such an overwhelming majority. In the following elections, under Golda, this majority disappeared, and after the 1973 elections, Labor dwindled to just 54 seats. However, together with other center and Left parties, Labor still maintained a majority.

But eight years after Eshkol's death, Labor lost its hegemony - which it had held without interruption for 42 years, since David Ben-Gurion was elected Jewish Agency chairman in 1935. Labor was to attain that blocking majority of 61 only once more - in 1992, under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin. But since 1977, Labor has been unable to hang onto the premiership for more than a total of eight years, in three separate periods, and its current Knesset faction of 22 members is the lowest in its history.

The history of the Israeli Labor Movement and its parties has been marked by ups and downs, rifts and reunification, since the turn of the 20th century. The pioneers of the Second Aliya - the second wave of Zionist immigration, which began in 1903 - brought with them ideology, tradition, and modi operandi from the socialist and communist parties of Eastern Europe, particularly Russia. Once here, they coalesced into groups, melding different measures and forms of Zionism and socialism, forming factions ranging from the social-democratic to the radical.

After World War I and during the British Mandatory period, these factions were forced to move past purely ideological debate and unite to organize and lead the growing number of workers in Palestine. The political map became more consolidated, and the Histadrut was founded - not only as a workers' union, but also as an organization providing health and social services. As there was no government at that time to provide such tools and services for the working class, the Histadrut filled a vacuum, creating more jobs in the service, construction and industry sectors.

In 1930, the two main workers' parties - Ahdut Ha'avoda and Hapoel Hatza'ir - merged to form Mapai, the Workers' Party in the Land of Israel. In a very short time, Mapai became the major player in Israeli and Zionist politics.

How did Mapai, and its more recent incarnation, the Labor Party, succeed, through democratic means, in becoming a major party - and for many years the only major political force - that brushed aside the liberal-centrist parties, as well as the nationalist Right? The answer lies in its combination of ideology and leadership. Historical fate brought together an impressive mixture of dreamers, pioneers, prophets, philosophers, organizers and statesmen of the highest caliber.

Although many of them are forgotten today - except in the names of buildings, streets, and villages - together they formed the finest group of leaders in modern Jewish history: Haim Arlosoroff, Moshe Beilinson, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Zalman Shazar, Eliahu Golomb, Dov Hoz, David Remez, Yosef Sprinzak and Berl Katznelson, to name a few - and topping the list, David Ben-Gurion.

For many years, beginning in 1920, the Labor Movement was shaped by the dual leadership of Katznelson and Ben-Gurion - two individuals radically different in character, but united in their total dedication to the creation of a new egalitarian Jewish society based on social-democratic principles, in the framework of an independent state. While Katznelson was more of an educator, Ben-Gurion was a commander. Both were highly realistic, and were open to change as dictated by the circumstances of the time.

The only real quarrel between the two great leaders concerned the question of partition. In 1938, the British government adopted the recommendation of the Peel Commission to partition Palestine into two states - Jewish and Arab. Ben-Gurion was for it, while Katznelson was against. After a long and fierce debate within Mapai, and at the 21st Zionist Congress held in Geneva in 1939, Ben-Gurion prevailed, and Katznelson accepted the majority decision. Others, led by Hakibbutz Hameuhad (United Kibbutz) ideologue Yitzhak Tabenkin, remained opposed, later leaving Mapai to form its own party - the new Ahdut Ha'avoda. Since that point, the idea of partition became a basic tenet of Mapai's political platform. Many of those who opposed Ben-Gurion at the time - among them Golda - were later to admit that he was right.

Katznelson died suddenly in 1944, but based on his writings, it can be assumed that he would have joined Ben-Gurion in supporting partition when it again became a serious option.

In 1938, the Arabs rejected the idea of partition, and the British abandoned it. Instead, the British adopted the Arab position of limiting Jewish immigration and land ownership.

In 1947, the UN resurrected the idea of partition - and this time Ben-Gurion's Mapai party supported it unanimously. Partition became one of the pillars of Mapai and the Labor Movement between 1947 and 1967. Under Israel's first three prime ministers, the basic concept was partitioning the land west of the Jordan river between a Jewish state with its capital in Jerusalem and an Arab state with its capital in Amman, with an authority in east Jerusalem. In 1952, Israel almost reached a peace agreement with Jordan based on these principles.

But Jordan's King Abdullah I, the great-grandfather of the current monarch, was assassinated a day before negotiations were to be concluded. The possibility of a peaceful compromise was buried for many years.

Nevertheless, the basic ideas of a permanent peaceful settlement remained. Ben-Gurion reiterated that settlement's parameters many times: He was satisfied with the 1949 armistice lines, seeing them as a base for permanent borders, with minor modifications, security arrangements and free Jewish access to Jewish holy sites in Jerusalem's Old City and the West Bank.

In his speeches, and in closed-door meetings with Israeli and world leaders, Ben-Gurion said that an Israel with its 1949 borders was capable of meeting the historical and future needs of the Jewish people, and that the sparsely populated Negev and Galilee offered plenty of room for absorbing all Jews arriving here. Not only that; the prime minister was willing to commit Israel, in a binding declaration, to those 1949 boundaries if the Soviet Union would only open its gates to Jewish emigration to Israel.

Compromise and partition were precepts that made Mapai extremely attractive to the voters - even to many who disagreed with the party's social philosophy or political tactics and manipulation. The Mapai worldview was practical and pragmatic, and the Labor leadership understood that statesmanship is the art of striving for the best options at the right time. Many Zionist dreamers had uttered inspirational statements - statements that remained impossible dreams. But by forging coalitions - whether ad hoc or permanent - and by properly directing forces at home and abroad, Ben-Gurion, together with his party's capable leadership, managed to make some of these dreams come true.

The second precept of Ben-Gurion's Mapai was its concept of security. In 1946, Ben-Gurion was the first to understand that the Jewish state's major struggle would not be against Britain, but against the Arab world. As defense minister, he began to prepare for a war for survival. As a result, the fledgling state's military, begun from scratch, was able to defend the country and triumph against all odds in the 1948 War of Independence. From many diverse underground paramilitary groups, Ben-Gurion had managed to create a unified army under civilian rule, and to avoid many of the pitfalls faced by new states after a long, bloody struggle for independence. Ben-Gurion's successor, Levi Eshkol, continued to build Israel's defense forces, which later met the challenge of the 1967 Six Day War with stunning success.

As well-prepared as Labor was for the Six Day War, it was ill-prepared, politically and ideologically, for the victorious aftermath. It reveled at too many victory parties, and let down its political and ideological guard. It allowed nationalism to set a new agenda, and forgot its longtime commitment to partition.

An aging Ben-Gurion issued warnings, but few heeded his words. About a year went by before Eshkol attempted to shake his party awake. He commenced secret negotiations with Jordan's King Hussein, and voiced aloud the need for territorial compromise. But he died before his efforts bore fruit.

Eshkol was an excellent prime minister. He was the right person to succeed Ben-Gurion, and continued with many of his predecessor's policies, with a gentler leadership style. But he was caught between competing forces: Golda, who felt that she should have been prime minister; the younger Labor generation, led by Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres; and Ben-Gurion himself, who resented Eshkol's success and popularity. Yet despite these intrigues, Eshkol gained popularity and was held in high esteem. History might have taken a different turn had Eshkol remained in power for several more years.

When she succeeded him, Golda did not continue in the direction of peace begun by Eshkol. She was overly influenced by the hawkish Labor elements, led by Yisrael Galili of the Ahdut Ha'avoda faction. Under the collective influence of Galili and Dayan, she failed to take advantage of numerous political opportunities to explore options for peace. Golda antagonized the Labor doves, who were led by Sapir, Abba Eban and Arie (Lova) Eliav, but the party leaders were reluctant to challenge her.

Since 1948, defense had been Mapai's main banner. For many years, all military leaders were connected to the Labor Movement. However, when Ezer Weizman and Ariel Sharon joined the Likud, it was obvious that Labor was beginning to lose its leadership monopoly on security matters.

The tragic devastation of the 1973 Yom Kippur War shocked the nation, and eroded one of Labor's main pillars of support. Golda's failure to prevent the war, first by diplomatic means and then by military might, spelled the end of Labor's uncontested power in Israel.

Labor's decline was not only the result of political and security factors. Its strength had also been based on its strong social-economic agenda. The Labor Movement had established most of the country's economic and social infrastructure - in fact, Israel was dependent on that infrastructure, as well as on the political, diplomatic and military successes that Labor had brought about. The Labor regime was not purely socialist or communist - government involvement in the economy was a necessity, not only an ideology.

That economic and social infrastructure allowed the country to do a reasonably good job of absorbing immigrants. It allowed the economy to continue to grow, even in times of war and instability. Under Labor, Israel became a welfare state, guaranteeing its citizens free education, free heath care and a modern social-security system. Through the Histadrut - Israel's Labor Federation - working Israelis maintained a relatively high standard of living, based on almost full employment and rapid economic growth.

For many years under Labor, Israelis achieved a high level of equality, and the salary discrepancy between the upper and lower echelons was one of the smallest in the free world.

But this trend began to shift between 1967 and 1973 - in the wrong direction. Social justice was no longer one of Labor's main priorities. Many Labor leaders did not notice the early signs of frustration in those who had not managed to get a piece of the pie. Labor was unable to understand the needs of the sons and daughters of the immigrants - particularly those from North Africa. While Labor had successfully courted and manipulated the first generation of these immigrants, it lost the younger generation, which, feeling rejected, turned instead to the Likud as its political voice.

David Levy, Meir Sheetrit, Moshe Katsav and others sought to join Labor when they first entered politics. But the "old guard" was uninterested in trying to understand them and their needs, while the "young guard" was too busy fighting the old guard. Thus, Labor lost a whole generation of young activists and potential leaders.

In that respect, Golda failed as prime minister, as under her leadership the Labor Party alienated an entire generation. In his analysis of the results of the 1969 general elections and his forecast for the next two elections, political scientist Prof. Asher Aryan predicted that over the course of the next two elections, Labor could lose its majority due to younger voters' changing voting patterns. He was right. Even without the tragic errors of the Yom Kippur War, Labor might have lost the elections, in which social and economic factors were even more dominant than political or military considerations.

Because of her errors in political and security judgment, Golda was forced to resign in April 1974. The Labor Party helm finally passed to the younger generation - but the opportunity to change the minds and hearts of the electorate had been missed. In his first term as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin instituted many badly needed reforms, but it was all too little, too late.

In the 1977 elections, Labor lost heavily; but the blow was not fatal because of its illustrious past. One of its great sources of strength was its rank and file. Labor had never been a one-man show. It was a paradoxical party - partly Bolshevik, but allowing freedom of discussion and debate. It had never been doctrinaire; its appeal was broad, and it had a large cadre of activists ready to serve the idea without immediate reward. Although a nominating committee of party leaders and bosses determined the Knesset list, first-term MKs took a back seat and worked hard to move up the party ladder instead of immediately demanding a cabinet seat, as is the case today, and the party attracted the working public with its leadership and socialist-Zionistagenda.

The Labor Party had many members willing to carry out the day-to-day political tasks. And it still had the Histadrut under its control. The United Kibbutz Movement and Moshav Movement were still going strong, and were able to keep the party alive despite its humiliating election defeat.

All of these forces enabled Labor to recoup in 1981 most of its losses. However, it still did not have a majority in the Knesset, because the formerly moderate National Religious Party, a longtime Labor ally, defected, becoming a Likud satellite. The constant infighting between the Rabin and Peres camps prevented Labor from attracting new ranks of activists and leaders.

During the early 1980s, a movement arose within the party to oust both Rabin and Peres, and to replace them with United Kibbutz Movement leader Moshe Harif. But with Harif's death in a car accident in 1982, the Labor Party lost its chance for a charismatic and able candidate who could move the party ahead. Since then, Labor has produced no leaders of Harif's caliber.

Over the years, one Labor stronghold after another fell: first the United Kibbutz Movement, and then the Moshav Movement. The Histadrut, demolished by Haim Ramon, brought the Labor Party to its nadir. The old guard faded away, and, unfortunately, those who followed lacked the selfless and unconditional dedication to the party, its leadership and the ideology of its erstwhile leaders. The coup de grace was administered by Ehud Barak - who failed utterly as the last hope of Labor and the Left. Barak believed that he did not need the party. He was given a mandate to rebuild Labor and adapt it to the needs of the 21st century - but forfeited that mandate by completely turning his back on his party, leaving it gutted.

As we look to the future, we see that the candidates vying for leadership in the Labor Party lack the qualifications, charisma, and "right stuff" to resuscitate the party and win the next elections. The long years of ideological vacuum, of increasing lack of clear-cut social or economic differences between Likud and Labor, and of internecine fighting have made Labor almost obsolete.

Even when Likud and Labor together held an absolute majority, until the elections of the current Knesset in 1999, Labor failed to join forces with the Likud to prevent the rise of the religious minority parties. This was particularly evident in the National Unity Government years of 1984 to 1990. Since Ben-Gurion's day, it has not managed to establish either a constitution or a system of government that would eliminate the small parties and put an end to the fragmentation of Israeli society.

Labor's glorious past is enshrined everywhere. But does it still have a future? The capable individuals of a stature sufficient to lead the party back to its central position have either died, moved to the political fringes, or abandoned politics altogether. Actively recruiting new faces from business and academe is the only way - if there is a way - for the Labor Party to build a new ideological base and establish a social agenda that will meet the needs of these difficult times.